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and had discussed with him at large the situation there. General Crerar was, in consequence, already aware, when the telegram of September 19, was received, that in the opinion of that officer the reinforcement of the garrison by two battalions would enable them to hold Hong Kong for an extended period again + any force the Japanese could bring to bear in an attack. I quote Gene Crerar's words:-
So far as general military situation at Hong Kong and prospective problem of its defence against attack were concerned, I had had long discussions in Ottawa, in July or August, 1941, with Major-General Grasett, who was passing through Canada on returning to the United Kingdom and who, until that time, had been Commander-in-Chief, China Command (Hong Kong). Major-General Grasett had filled the appointment of Commander- in-Chief at Hong Kong for some two years, and until his departure for the United Kingdom had been responsible for the organization of the defences. In his verbal appreciation of the military situation confronting the Hong Kong garrison in the event of war with Japan, Major-General Grasett informed me during our conversation that the addition of two or more battalions to the forces then at Hong Kong would render the garrison strong enough to withstand for an extensive period of siege an attack by such forces as the Japanese could bring to bear against it. General Crerar proceeds:-
It is evident that Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Grasett presented the same views to the War Office and to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on his return to London, that this appreciation of the situation at Hong Kong, with the need for two additional battalions, was accepted in London and that the request to Canada for the provision of these addi- tional troops immediately followed.
It was with minds actuated by a deep sense of the obligations of Canada in relation to the common cause that the members of the War Committee (The Prime Minister, Hon. T. A. Crerar, Major Power, Mr. Macdonald), as well as the Chief of the General Staff, gave their attention to the proposal of the British Government; and the evidence of Colonel Ralston, Major Power and Mr. Macdonald shows explicitly that to them, and to the War Committee as a whole, the proposal summarizes what they regarded as reasons of great weight which, taken together with the broader considerations that are men- tioned by them in their evidence, dictated an affirmative answer. They all had in mind, to use Colonel Ralston's phrase, that "it seemed as if it was Canada's turn to help." Colonel Ralston says:-
That is to say, Australia had been doing a great deal in Libya and elsewhere; the New Zealanders had been in Crete; and the South Africans had been in Abyssinia. I am not sure whether I knew that the Australians had gone to Singapore or not. Then the United States had strengthened their garrisons in the Philippines and that also influenced us in connection with it.
Major Power says, referring to his consultation with General Crerar:-
And I do not think there was ever any question really or any dis- cussion as between General Crerar and myself as to any reason why we should not take it on. It struck me as being the only thing to do, and I suppose it struck General Crerar that way too; at least I took it for granted that it did.
And again:-
Well, I thought the United Kingdom authorities had made a pretty good case in their cable and I thought their argument was pretty strong and there was not very much to be said about it. I do not know that I
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need go over it, except that I should say this, that what did influence me to some extent was: Here were our partners in a great enterprise in the war, saying: 'If you have any men to spare we would be glad to have them'; and in my opinion we had certain unallotted battalions in Canada which could be spared, and I did not see any reason why they should not have them.
Mr. Macdonald says:--
I might put it this way, my Lord. I do not think anyone would contemplate in the circumstances of the time a negative answer to the request. I do not think it was thinkable for this country to offer a negative answer to the request of the United Kingdom.
Colonel Ralston explains the specific impression made upon his mind by the reading of the telegram:---
I, of course, went over the telegram carefully which was really the basis of the proposal and contained many of the factors which it seemed to me would influence us in acting on it. I noted also that The Chief of the General Staff sees no objection if the Minister approves'; and I noted that my colleagues of the War Committee of the Cabinet were prepared to accede to the proposal but would like my reaction
I appreciated my colleagues showing me the courtesy of referring the matter to me, and took it immediately into consideration. After reading the telegram I did feel it was a matter that justified attention at once. I noted that they suggested that I should have more time, if I desired, but it seemed to me that the implications of the telegram were that the sooner this matter was decided perhaps the better, having regard to the situation which the expedition was purporting to deal with, and I imme- diately took it into consideration.
Without labouring it, the considerations set out in the telegram were very largely the factors which influenced me in connection with it.
I had at the end of the consideration of the telegram this in mind, that the furnishing of one or two battalions would do a great deal more than a force of that size would usually do. It seemed to me from what I knew generally that above all things we needed time, and I had very definitely in my mind, rightly or wrongly, that if Japan did come into the war the United States would be in, too; and I had it definitely in my mind that the United States were none too ready to come in, and anything which would either defer or deter Japan from coming in would be highly desirable from our point of view It seemed to me that we had an opportunity to make a con- tribution, perhaps not large in numbers but certainly effective in its results, which we should not disregard."
Mr. Macdonald says:-
We were influenced largely by the statements set out in the cable, which were merely a confirmation or repetition, to a very large extent, at any rate, of matters which we were already aware of. We knew, for instance, that it was the desire of the Americans to gain as much time as possible before there should be an outbreak of war with Japan. I knew that the Naval position in the Far East was likely to be strengthened, or was in the process of being strengthened at that time.
Q. Likely to be strengthened?-A. A. Likely to be and perhaps even
at that time was in the process of being strengthened.
Q. Was in the course of being strengthened?--A. Yes, at that time. Q. Yes.-A. We knew that a good deal of stress was laid in all deal- ings with Japan on the element of a show of strength, and, generally, I think all matters set out in the cable had already been within our knowl-
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